At the core of political conflicts between Poland and Ukraine lies a divergent understanding of history. However, these contradictions can be overcome if historical disputes are not politicized but are instead approached through a shared understanding of the state as an instrument of the legal system designed to ensure normal social life. Political contradictions with Russia, however, are fundamentally irreconcilable. Even if enlightened liberals were to come to power in Russia, they would not be able to change the historical fact that Russia developed as a militarized state whose essence is not law but a mechanism of violence.
Alexander Lukashenko, who ruled Belarus for nearly 32 years through extremist state terror is now trapped by inescapable forces. Between his economic and military dependence on Moscow and the existential threats from his own population, he finds his survival at the mercy of factors beyond his clutch.
Is the diplomatic conflict between Poland and Ukraine purely ideological, or is it rooted in questions of national identity? Dr. Yulia Fil, a culturologist, offers an academic answer free of political judgments.
Only in relatively recent times in democratic countries have sexual relations come to be understood primarily as a sphere of personal freedom and individual choice. Such an approach is unacceptable to the contemporary Russian authorities, which in their attitude toward sexuality demonstrate not merely conservatism but a drive to revive the most primitive forms of social control. As a result, sexual humiliation becomes one of the instruments used to maintain the system of power and to mobilize society for war.
US troops stationed in Europe serve as an important deterrent against potential Russian aggression. Withdrawing these troops from Poland and other countries would not only weaken their defensive capabilities but would also signal that Washington is unwilling to deter future Russian aggression.
Before the war, Russian Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Muslims, and Vaishnavas communicated with their fellow believers in Ukraine, recognizing a shared identity. Yet when faced with the choice between supporting a war against a neighboring people and preserving fellowship with their Ukrainian co-believers, most of them chose the war. Is it possible to change their minds? How did it happen that the messianic idea of Russia became more important to them not only than the lives of their fellow believers, but even than their own religion?
Western intelligence services still do not see signs of preparations for an attack on the Baltic states, and a number of political and economic arguments can be made against such a scenario. However, there is another argument that is often overlooked – Russia’s messianic goal-setting, which is what brought a man like Putin to power.
In Russia, young people – known as “zoomers” – have flocked to the internet, where they form subcultures and acquire new knowledge and communication skills independently of school and family. However, the Russian authorities intend to restrict the free internet as much as possible. What might this lead to?
