Alexander Lukashenko, who ruled Belarus for nearly 32 years through extremist state terror is now trapped by inescapable forces. Between his economic and military dependence on Moscow and the existential threats from his own population, he finds his survival at the mercy of factors beyond his clutch.
His cooperation with Russia has allowed his regime to exist, but brought risks of retaliations from the West. The support that Russia has given come with costs. The threat of sanctions from Europe has isolated Belarus and made Minsk more tied to Moscow. Even the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), headquartered in Beijing, has halted all activities and lending relating to Belarus (and Russia) since March 2022 – a month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
His previous balancing act between Moscow and the West has long collapsed. Because of his growing dependence and entanglement with Putin’s war, the West sees little use for him as a back channel to Putin. Lukashenko’s vassalage compelled Emmanuel Macron
to issue a warning over recent cooperative military maneuvers. Repercussions could mean more diplomatic isolation, additional economic sanctions, and possible military retaliation.
The military operations that provoked Macron’s call include conducting joint Russian and Belarusian tactical nuclear weapons exercises and allowing Russia to use Belarusian communication towers to enhance the strike capabilities of Shahed drones inside Ukraine. Co-mingled with these threats are increasing efforts by Moscow to expand Belarus’s role in its hybrid war against Europe.
Russia has been absorbing Belarus’s military-industrial complex since the beginning of its special military operation. Belarus is already being used as a Russian platform for training grounds and logistics routes for potential offensives, specifically; as a staging area for opening another northern front.
Reports are that over 80% of all Belarusian defense companies have been fully integrated into fulfilling Russia’s state defense orders and armaments programs. According to Ukrainian Intelligence, factories have been repurposed to bypass Western sanctions. Restricted technologies find their way into Russia through Belarusian facilities. There, repairs and modernization retooling take place for damaged Russian armored vehicles, aircraft, and automated command systems.
At the same time, Lukashenko has frenetically resisted committing Belarusian troops in the ground campaign against Ukraine. He understands, as does Moscow, that turning Belarus into a joint combatant could ignite domestic backlash and destabilize the regime. Therefore, the decision to maintain Belarus as a secure support base rather than an unreliable ally in the field is a sign of Minsk and Moscow’s anxieties about the war, not a mark of strength or confidence.
Since the manipulated election in 2020, which granted Lukashenko his seventh term, approximately 5,000 Belarusian men have defected to Ukraine. They formed several combat units within the Ukrainian army. The Kalinouski Regiment is one such unit that is heavily armed and has its own recruitment and training structures. Further, Belarus has no history or grounds for conflict with Ukraine. It is quite reasonable to assume that if faced with options most Belarusians would likely defect instead of being used as fodder for Russia’s catastrophic war of attrition.
Minsk has approximately 46,000 officers in its national police force. Those numbers include prison guards, clerks and other civilian staff. A mere additional 1,500 comprise the Special Purpose Mobile Unit (Otryad Mobilny Osobogo Naznacheniya – OMON). These are the elite riot police. It is obvious that Lukashenko would need help from Moscow in order to survive should he face a mutinous military of some 50,000 active duty members and a rebellious population. However, there is much doubt whether Russia could even muster enough reserves required to support Belarusian troops in a ground war in Ukraine – let alone any additional security forces to quell internal unrest.
Should Lukashenko’s regime face an insurrection, an additional front within Belarus would be catastrophic. The specter of such turn of events comes at a time when an already disastrous military campaign is severely overstretched for material resources and manpower. Russia’s own finance officials and lawmakers warned the country that the war at this point is unaffordable and unsustainable. Consequently, any shattering of the equilibrium which Lukashenko has tried to maintain looms over the future of the power configuration of the region and Europe.
Zelensky attempted to put his finger on its scale by formally hosting Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Tsikhanouskaya is the Belarusian opposition leader and winner of the 2020 presidential election according to widespread consensus and by accounts of independent observers. Her visit in May underscored Ukraine’s solidarity with the opposition by publicly drawing a line between the regime’s authority and the will of the Belarusian people.
Zelensky also appointed Yaroslav Chornohor as ambassador-at-large to act as envoy to the Belarusian democratic forces. This is no mild riposte or symbolic gesture. It is a strategic move intended to hit a gaping vulnerability.
Lukashenko has always been a politician obsessed with making sure domestic politics remain, durable, foreseeable, and controllable. Yet by becoming Moscow’s “Governor of Minsk”, he has ceded control. As David Kirichenko and Alexander Motyl have rightly observed: “…the vassalage that brought Lukashenko stability and sustained his presidency now threatens to undermine him.”
Having lashed himself to Putin’s fate, he is consigned to the sidelines to wait for events to unfold. Among the most major foils of Putin’s is the irony that in the quest for empire, his illegal war against Ukraine has turned Russia into a vassal state of China.
Lukashenko and Putin’s fate are inextricably meshed. If one should fall, it is very likely the other will follow. The future for both presidents is unpredictable at best.
One telling sign was Putin’s recent trip to Beijing. No major concord was concluded, including an agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. However, a concert was the highlight of the closing ceremony. The final piece – Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake.
Swan Lake is traditionally interpreted as an expression of the ‘duality of human nature’. In modern times, it has become a symbol of political upheaval often played and broadcasted during times of nation crisis. For many Russians, the ballet is an ikon for impending political doom and a society waiting for change.
Xi Jinping is no fool. He understands the subtle rhythms of diplomacy. He displayed such deftness when he sent Donald Trump home from their meeting with packets of rose flower seeds.
A question lingering over the past state visit with Putin may just as well pertain to Lukashenko. Was Xi paying tribute to one of Russia’s greatest contribution to world art at the performance of Swan Lake, or was he giving us a wink and a nod?
