President Joe Biden’s decision to authorize Ukraine to use an American long-range weapon, the Army Tactical Missile System or ATACMS, to hit targets inside Russia is, as the Washington Post puts it, a “significant reversal in U.S. policy” made possible by Moscow’s deployment of some 10,000 North Korean troops in Kursk Province, occupied since the summer by Ukrainian forces.

Why ATACMS Matters: Three Reasons Putin Should Worry

The missile system is unlikely to be a game changer or silver bullet, but it’s important for several reasons.

First, the ATACMS will enable Ukraine to resist more effectively Russia’s attempts to regain Kursk with a 50,000-man army that includes the North Koreans. The original incursion has been interpreted in numerous ways, with some analysts arguing it’s militarily pointless and others arguing that it diverts Russian troops from other fronts and is therefore beneficial for Ukraine.

But the most important aspect of Ukraine’s invasion and occupation of Russian territory is political. It makes Putin, who ordered his generals to recapture the territory by October 1, look weak. The continued occupation signals to Russians, elites more so than masses, that Russia is not invincible. It also strengthens Ukraine’s hand in any future negotiations by making it impossible for Russia to agree to a freezing of the battlefront line and thereby effectively cede part of Mother Russia’s sacred soil to “neo-Nazi” Ukrainians.

Kyiv can now insist on more favorable terms, whatever they might happen to be, in exchange for Kursk. Since Russia is willing to sacrifice 40,000 soldiers every month, it’s possible for the army of 50,000 to be annihilated in five weeks—to be followed by yet another and another until the Ukrainians run out of bullets or the Russians run out of bodies. But that won’t happen tomorrow, and in the meantime even some Russians may be awed by the mountains of Russian corpses and decide the self-slaughter should end.

Second, President Biden’s decision to let Ukraine target Russian sites with the ATACMS could have an important, if not decisive, impact on the Russian ability to wage war. True, Putin has withdrawn most of its warplanes and other assets out of ATACMS range. But there are ample targets within range, such as airfields, refineries, electrical power stations, and the like. In particular, Russian army bases are within ATACMS range, and striking them with deadly weapons would not only degrade the Russian army but also contribute to a further reduction of what many observers agree is already a depressed Russian morale.

Putin is now in a pickle. He lacks the personnel and the equipment to retaliate: hence his turn to North Korea for help. His planes are already destroying Ukraine’s infrastructure and civilians. He has escalated pretty much at will since the very first escalation, the invasion of February 24, 2022, and suffered almost no consequences from a pusillanimous West. Now, finally, Biden has shown that there is no free lunch, even if belatedly and at the cost of thousands of Ukrainian lives.

Third, the ATACMS signals to both Putin and Trump that the United States has not yet abdicated. Biden’s move thereby puts the President-elect in a pickle. He could of course retract the permission as soon as he is inaugurated, but that would make him look like putty in Putin’s hands. It would also greatly weaken his hand in his search for a deal that would end the war. After all, even non-geniuses know that one doesn’t go into a negotiation by agreeing to your opponent’s terms beforehand. Recall that weakness was one of the key accusations Trump made against “sleepy Joe.” To assume the role of “impotent Donald” would probably not go over well with the MAGA crowd.

Biden has pulled off a masterstroke. In one move he has helped the Ukrainians, complicated life for Putin and the Russians, and potentially embarrassed his rival, Donald Trump. Now it’s up to Trump to make America great again by making Ukraine fully sovereign again.

Photo: defense.gov

About the Author: Dr. Alexander Motyl

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines.

He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.” The text you just read was published in National Security Journal.