In 1918, the year following the Bolshevik takeover of the Russian government, Lenin appointed Leon Trotsky the leader of the Red Army. Trotsky at the time was commissar of foreign affairs. His new position involved the daunting task of transforming a sloppy network of detachments into a formidable and disciplined military. Conscription, discipline, and a doctrine that insisted there exists a constant state of siege between and within nations and societies helped earn victories against counterrevolutionary adversaries (foreign and domestic) and create the fortress state that became the USSR and the system and mindset that has endured.
Short:
- Conflict as a constant state – Lenin and Trotsky believed the world is in a perpetual state of siege; war and politics are one and the same concept.
- No absolute rules of conduct – Trotsky and Lenin argued that in war and politics, all available means must be used; morality is secondary to effectiveness.
- Bespredel as a foundation of policy – The term, meaning “without limits” or moral order, originates in criminal subculture and became a model for Kremlin behavior.
- Mafia state – Russian authorities are deeply intertwined with organized crime; Putin did not fight the mafia but aligned with it.
- Geopolitical paranoia – The loss of superpower status deepened Russia’s sense of threat and its perception of the world as a web of enemies.
- Reaction to the “color revolutions” – Changes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan reinforced the Kremlin’s belief in controlling the “near abroad.”
- The special operation as Putin’s imperative – The war in Ukraine is not only about Russia’s interests but also about the survival of the system and Putin himself.
- War economy – 40% of the Russian economy is devoted to the war effort; an abrupt end to the conflict would trigger systemic collapse.
- Unprofitable occupation – Even a potential victory in Ukraine would bring long-term internal destabilization and require repressive control.
- The West as both target and tool – The Kremlin cultivates ties with corrupt Western elites; cooperation with “scoundrels” is part of its strategy.
The USSR as a system that cannot exist without war
The belief that “conflict is a constant,” is a tradition that shapes and drives present government policy. In this environment of never-ending struggle, Lenin preached any army which does not train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even criminal manner. This, he claimed, applies to politics even more than it does to the art of war.
In the current Russian military and political doctrine, force is one of several “instruments of policy.” The Clausewitzean concept of war as a “continuation of politics by other means” turns on its head fitting within the Leninist framework. In this context, “war and politics are a single concept.” This constant conflict applies to enemies both external and internal. In the post–Cold War environment, the inherited mind-sets of the Cold War era never fundamentally changed. In fact, they intensified.
Russia’s reduced status to a regional power and the loss of military supremacy and economic influence raised the sense of paranoia. The Kremlin sees the world as a sea of foreign threats and considers itself more vulnerable since it lost its status as one of the two great super powers.
The whole world against us and the underworld with us — Russian paranoia in practice
The color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan confirmed the kremlin’s fears and fueled its obsessive distrust of the west. Even the activities of NGOs, such as Greenpeace’s protests against drilling oil reserves in the Arctic, heighten their perceptions of a world mobilizing against their interests. This siege mentality legitimizes the Russian notion of Bespredel.
Bespredel, literally ‘without boundaries’ is a term originating from criminal subculture. A more precise definition means a complete lack of legal or moral order. It came into more popular use in the 1990s to describe post-Soviet social disorder. But this culture of extreme and/or unprincipled behavior is not confined to criminal elements, it extends to kremlin policies. Under Putin the state did not attempt to combat organized crime, it reached out to it.
The Soviet state was known for its corruption and long-standing ties to criminal spheres. The links between official circles and the underworld are still intimately entangled and run deep. Together they created a mutually reinforcing community of interacting organs in a hopelessly venal environment. Often the kremlin has acted through its associates in the underground to give it the cover of plausible deniability around the world.
Putin adopted methods and techniques of the bespredel ethic early in his presidency. Selective repression against governors and federal officials domestically, and the use of cyber operations, active measures, hybrid warfare, and assassination abroad represent a portfolio of means for defending Russia’s interests. Now, his soi disant ‘special military operation’ is more than about Russia’s interest, it may be about Putin’s survival.
Read too: Party of the Dead against Putin’s Russia
The “near abroad,” the fourteen former Soviet republics and Eastern bloc states with sizable Russian-speaking populations, have been a target of Moscow’s strategy to reclaim the Soviet empire and coerce sovereign governments to align with Russian national interests. It was not only part of a grand strategy, but in Putin’s view, it was his manifest destiny.
Unfortunately for him, he finds himself in a war he dares not lose and cannot win. Either can he afford to withdraw. Forty percent of the Russian economy is devoted to the war effort. Demobilization from a war economy requires a reorganization of the industrial base and takes years. If the war in Ukraine were to come to a sudden halt, so would the Russian economy. The system would be thrown into crises.
At the same time, the conflict is costing Russia $900 million a day. Should Putin achieve the unlikely goal of subjugating Kiev, what would be the cost of a pacification force? Not only would security forces be assigned the task of suppressing a hostile population in Ukraine, but also defending assets within their borders. Ukrainians have proved adept at sabotage, clandestine operations and assassination inside Russia. A military victory in Ukraine would mean more instability at home, thus, more oppressive regimes, and economic decline.
Western corrupt elites and Russia’s business collaborators
Putin’s neuroticism in world affairs is what George Kennan called an “instinctive sense of insecurity”. In his famous piece known as The Long Telegram, Kennan went on to write: “Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries.”
The notion that “there are no absolute rules of conduct” forms the essence of kremlin policy. Bespredel is the quintessential expression and guiding principle. To Putin, human atrocity in a war is a given. So too are diplomatic, economic, financial, technological, cultural, and any legal and illegal measures for the sake of political or military victory. To that end, the kremlin elite will cultivate relationships with corrupt elites in the West. Accomplices and collaborators in business, banking, and politics provide Russian leadership the access, means, and cover it needs to work toward its aims—no matter how much it undermines the society. Lenin was aware of this, too, when he said, “There are no morals in politics; there is only expedience. A scoundrel may be of use to us just because he is a scoundrel.”
How the west meets the challenges posed by Russia is still unanswered. If Russia can survive its self-defeating fixation for conflict is another mystery. Both questions are overdue to unfold.
Jack Jarmon has taught international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and Rutgers University where he was Associate Director and Research Professor at the Command Control and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis. During the mid 1990s, he served as USAID Technical Advisor for the Russian government. He has lectured at major universities and war colleges and authored and co-authored five books, which are currently core texts for international and security studies programs in the US and abroad.
Image by Дмитрий Осипенко from Pixabay
