Are we really already in Cold War 2.0? Earlier this month, Gen. Timothy D. Haugh, the head of both the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, was fired by the Trump administration. Why is General Haugh’s dismissal worth attention? Because it makes no sense.
The outcry came from both sides of the US Senate. Mitch McConnell Republican from Kentucky remarked, “If decades of experience in uniform isn’t enough to lead the N.S.A…., then what exactly are the criteria for working on this administration’s national security staff? …I can’t figure it out.”
Mark Warner, Democrat from Virginia argued, “At a time when the United States is facing unprecedented cyber threats, as the Saalt Typhoon cyberattack from China has so clearly underscored, how does firing him make Americans any safer?”
Warner’s angst over the threat from the PRC is fully justified. Yet, his remarks come as Russia intensifies its intimidation tactics across Europe. Adding to the bewilderment is that Timothy Haugh is not only a decorated Iraqi war veteran with advanced degrees in Telecommunication and Joint Information Operations, he also holds a degree in Russian Studies.
Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has upped its recruitment of criminals in European countries for sabotage operations across the continent. These exploits include arson, attempted assassination and planting bombs on cargo aircraft. Yet, a well-developed praxis and subtler means of attacking an enemy’s will is through “active measures” (activniye meropriyatiya)
The Russian Cold War idiom, “active measures” applies to operations that involve false news and accounts, the use of front groups, and forged documents to discredit individuals, institutions, and policies. These practices are distinct from espionage, which are operations deployed to gather information. Active measures are operations deployed to influence events. Russia has been using influence campaigns and cyber operations to erode support for Ukraine years before the invasion.
The technology of the Information Age and the process of globalization have enabled new opportunities and enriched such operations with a new potency. To take advantage of the possibilities, Russia has created an infrastructure of technical resources populated with hacktivists and operatives with honed skills. The same personnel and expertise often machinate with small armies of internet trolls to deepen and amplify these campaigns. “A lie told often enough becomes the truth,” is a quote sometimes attributed to Lenin (as well as Joseph Goebbels, Adolf Hitler, and even invoked today as opposing political sides attempt to control the narrative) is more than a mere reference. It is a mantra, inspiration, and central pith of operations. The U.S. has also engaged in active measures of its own. However, not with the same unbridled access to domestic economic/market levers and the capability to manipulate a subservient press.
Independent hackers, criminal elements, and anonymous state security organizations with deep covers form an ambiguous army to disrupt communications and disseminate propaganda and false information. According to the 2013 Russian government document, Basic Principles for the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Field of Information Security to 2020, the strategy warns:
“…the use of information and communication technology as an information weapon for political and military purposes with a view to interfering in the internal affairs of states, … undermining public order, inciting ethnic, racial or religious hostility, promoting racist and xenophobic ideas and theories leading to hate and discrimination and encouraging violence.”
In February of the same year at a Russian military forum, a featured article attributed to Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov appeared. It was called Value of Science in Anticipation: New Challenges Require Rethinking of the Forms and Methods of Warfare.
Despite its colorless title, the document was groundbreaking. While it restated the elements and significance of unconventional warfare, it urged an emphasis on these nonmilitary methods and instruments to achieve military effects. The article was specific enough to suggest the use of espionage, propaganda, and cyberattacks be adapted at a four-to-one ratio of nonmilitary to military measure in order to contain the use of armed force. The calculation gave the doctrine (now referred to as the Gerasimov doctrine) a new scope of opportunity during times of peace and the flexibility to adjust the ratio as situations warrant during open conflict.
A particular focus within the thesis of the doctrine is the “protest potential of the population.” This model works most effectively when the preconditions of a disaffected population are present and sympathetic to calls for mobilization.
The rumbling distrust by the public of the news media and elites in general provide a beacon of opportunity for active measures and nonlinear war tactics to shape the political landscape. Gerasimov’s essay noted: “a perfectly thriving state can … be transformed in to an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos.”
European intelligence officials estimate there are scores of crime groups inside Russia with “nation-state level” capacity to overcome virtually any cyber-defense mechanism. In addition to being part of the government’s active measures operations, they conduct financial crimes on an industrial scale.
The United States has always been the prime target. Taking advantage of US freedom of speech, the gaps in the current election finance laws, and the messaging platforms of social media, Russia launched one of its “boldest” active measure campaign during the 2016 presidential campaign. Four years after the publication of Gersimov’s article, the office of the Directorate of National Intelligence released to the public its own document Assessing Russian Activities and Intensions in Recent U.S. Elections. Its key judgment reads as follows:
“We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We have high confidence in these judgments.”
General Timothy Haugh has been dismissed. The NSC has stopped coordinating efforts across U.S. agencies to monitor Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign.
The FBI ended its program to counter interference in U.S. elections by foreign adversaries. Staff working on the same issue at the Department of Homeland Security were put on leave.
Disbanded, also, is the team at the Department of Justice that seized assets of Russian oligarchs.
However, General Valery Gerasimov is still Chief of Russia’s General Staff despite his management of the disastrous and tragic war against Ukraine. Regardless of the outcome of the war, Russia’s reliance on active measure campaigns to project power on a global level is alive and critical. Its dependence on hackers, trolls, spies and criminals is most likely to increase.
