Dr. Oleksandr Maslak. The founder of the party and the chief ideologist of Azov was killed by a truck carrying logs. Before his death, he gave us an interview. Here it is

Dr. Oleksandr Maslak died in a car accident on March 6, 2017. The car in which he was returning with other political scientists from a conference in Warsaw dedicated to the idea of Intermarium was hit by a truck loaded with logs. In Kyiv, speculation immediately arose as to whether the experts had been killed. Why? That remains unknown to this day. We met in the capital of Ukraine a few weeks before their deaths. I did not know then that it would be the last interview Dr. Oleksandr Maslak would give in his life.

Dr. Oleksandr Maslak was a scientist and philosopher, and one of the founders of the political party called the National Corps (Ukrainian: Національний корпус). The group exists to this day, and its leader is Andriy Biletsky, the commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade and former head of Azov. It is from this already legendary unit that most of the political party’s members originate. When I conducted this interview with Dr. Oleksandr Maslak in 2017, both Azov and the party itself were still little known abroad, and even in Ukraine itself. The Corps had just been registered, and Maslak was seeking allies in Poland, as at that time Ukraine was excluded from the idea of Intermarium, which was then being proposed by politicians from the ruling Law and Justice party. There was no willingness to talk to Ukrainians. The Polish parliament had just passed a resolution on the Volhynia genocide. Much has changed since then, but the words of Oleksandr Maslak, which I found years later on an old hard drive, are still relevant.

National Corps and Azov. Strongly Arm in Arm

Piotr Kaszuwara: I’d like to start with the basics. The National Corps party was recently established. Your organization grew out of a military formation, the so-called volunteers from the Azov Regiment. Can you now officially be called a political party?

Dr. Oleksandr Maslak, one of the founders of the National Corps party: Yes. We are already registered with the Ministry of Justice. This means that the party officially exists. However, we face quite a few challenges. We are building a classic, mass-based party. We don’t want it to be a marketing-driven political project. It is meant to be a party with its own centers, with members who, of course, will pay membership fees, and we want to sustain ourselves from these funds. That’s why we feel it’s difficult, as this is one of the first parties of its kind in Ukraine.

You are also forming from military structures.

Not only. Sixty percent of the party members are former military personnel. Soldiers who fought on the front lines. However, the party is not linked to the regiment. Azov is part of the National Guard, and in our country, military service is apolitical. For this reason, officially, we have no relations with the regiment.

How many members does the National Corps have today?

Almost ten thousand. However, we are still in the process of shaping the party. Some people leave, others join. But roughly, we now have ten thousand members.

Where did the idea of creating a political party out of Azov come from?

We first discussed this in 2016. Unfortunately, at that time, most of the key activists were on the front lines. Creating a party under wartime conditions is an extremely complicated matter. Today, we have a state of greater or lesser truce, a period of calm. That’s why we can focus on building political structures.

Read too: Two years of captivity: where are Azov fighters kept? Video by Khrystyna Lutsyk

What is the purpose of this?

(Laughs) A party is created to gain power. We want to have a faction in the parliament, in the Verkhovna Rada. We also want to actively participate in local government, in self-governance. So, the main goal is a political one.

What idea guides you?

Our ideology is very broad. We have a program that outlines our economic plans, army expansion, and social development. We are conservatives, broadly understood patriots, and perhaps also nationalists, but specifically economic nationalists.

Oleksandr Maslak na Międzynarodowym Kongresie Badaczy Białorusi
Oleksandr Maslak at the International Congress of Belarusian Researchers, private archive.

Dr. Oleksandr Maslak: An End to Oligarchs. These Are His Economic Ideas

How do you envision reforming Ukraine’s economy?

We are roughly liberals when it comes to small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. And (laughs) we are roughly socialists in relation to oligarchs. Above all, we are for deregulating the economy, for lowering taxes specifically for small and medium-sized businesses. On one hand, we are for demonopolization and for returning state control over monopolies. We are particularly focused on the energy and gas monopolies and the systems of gas delivery in Ukraine. These should return to state hands.

Do you want to move toward the capitalism we know in the West?

Yes, but with greater or lesser state control over certain sectors of the economy.

In your opinion, who controls these sectors today?

The oligarchs. Especially those connected to power and bureaucracy. However, we are talking about sectors that are strategic for the economy. When it comes to the food, entertainment, service, recreational industries, and so on, we believe that the principles of capitalism, as in the West, will be effective.

Would you like smaller entrepreneurs to drive the economy?

Yes, but when it comes to advanced technology or areas of the fourth industrial revolution, we believe there must be some state intervention. The state must support and control these areas.

War and the European Union: “No one is inviting us there”

Today, the problem for ordinary people is low wages, unemployment, high bills for water, electricity, shop prices, the decline in the value of the hryvnia, and of course, the war. How do you plan to address this?

First and foremost, there is no strategic thinking from the government. What future do the ruling parties want to see for Ukraine? How do politicians envision the fate of Ukrainian industry given the current situation in Donbas? Because of this, we have no support for science or the mentioned high technologies.

Because that requires money, and right now, that money is going elsewhere. Military spending has increased several times over in the last three years.

That’s why we need to think about investments. About the possibility of bringing investors to Ukraine.

Foreign ones?

Both stimulating internal ones and encouraging foreign ones.

And the European Union?

We are not opponents of the European Union. It’s just about the price we will have to pay for these investments. However, the main problem in Ukraine is that previous governments, for decades, did not think about investing in the country’s future. They only thought about loans.

So, how do you imagine relations with the EU? Would you like Ukraine to join its structures?

(laughs) For now, no one is inviting us. In fact, I think that in the next ten years, no one will be inviting us there.

And if they did?

We are not against it, although I am somewhat skeptical about the form that the European Union takes today. Our party is more of a pan-European one. And… (laughs) the current structure of the EU, in our view, is anti-pan-European. It undermines the pull of people toward unity.

Ukraine Beyond the Intermarium. Poland Didn’t See It Here

Today, it is impossible to run an economy alone. Large countries and powerful players on the international stage matter. Russia, the USA, the European Union. This is a certain order formulated after World War II.

Yes, but when it comes to fundamental freedoms, deregulation, and lowering taxes, the European Union is not a good example. A better example might be Singapore, Taiwan, or South Korea and their model of soft socialism. We want to create cooperation mechanisms based on the same principles, but distinct from the post-Soviet economic system. When the law is uniform and clear, it will stabilize the market and encourage entrepreneurs to spend money.

And what about the Intermarium?

Sometimes, someone asks me if Ukraine wants to pull Poland out of the EU. That’s not the point. There is something called the Northern Council. It includes countries like Finland and Sweden, which are not NATO members, but also Norway and Iceland, which are not members of the EU, while being in NATO. There is also Denmark. This doesn’t prevent the creation of such a regional integration forum. It’s about coordinating economic, transport, defense, and energy actions together.

Dreams of National Socialism in Ukraine

What about your historical policy? Azov has been stigmatized with a shameful label tied to national socialism and a fascination with Nazism.

(laughs) I won’t comment on that, because we have no relation to that type of national socialism.

Andriy Biletsky, your parliamentarian and commander of the Azov Regiment, is still associated with neo-Nazi movements. He’s the leader of the National-Social Assembly in Ukraine.

Everyone was young at one time and belonged to various organizations. Right-wing or any others. For instance, Joszka Fiszer, who was questioned by the prosecutor’s office due to his activities in the RAF. He was a member of extreme left-wing organizations, and no one later held that against him.

So, who could you form a coalition with in Ukraine?

We have contacts with both right-wing and moderate movements. However, we do not support extremely radical views.

There must be some line of political history in Ukraine that you rely on.

We don’t live in history. We look to the future. We have certain examples, but we don’t turn it into a fight for saints. We have heroes who fought for Ukraine’s independence, but we don’t turn that reverence into a dogma. Let’s remember that the Ukrainian view on historical politics is very different from the Polish one.

Dr Oleksandr Maslak na konferencji dotyczącej koncepcji Intermarium, czyli Międzymorza. Fot. arch. prywatne
Dr. Oleksandr Maslak at a conference on the concept of Intermarium, or the “Miedzymorze” (Intermarium). Photo: private archive.

Poland, Ukraine, Bandera, and Volhynia: Maslak’s Foreign Policy

In the context of building relations with neighbors, such as Poland, historical policy seems to be important.

Of course, but we have a different approach than, for example, Svoboda. They replace Lenin’s statues with Bandera statues. For us, that seems a bit strange. We respect it, of course, but neither religion nor such political discussions are of primary importance to us.

So, who would you like to cooperate with in Poland?

Starting with groups like Szturm to the ruling party, Law and Justice (PiS). We are not closed to any dialogue with Poland, except for some extreme left-wing or extreme liberal organizations. Of course, anti-Ukrainian groups are not an option.

And what about radical groups like Falanga or the Camp of Great Poland? These organizations talk about the genocide of Poles by Ukrainians.

We have nothing to do with the views of the nationalists from Falanga.

Their ideas for the Intermarium Union are similar to yours.

I don’t see Ukraine in their model. It’s a kind of “Duginism without Dugin.” In my opinion, Polish Duginists look like lunatics.

And what about the Law and Justice Party? It’s our government. They are the ones to talk to about international policy and cooperation.

We are not against it. It all depends on them. We would like to cooperate. A moderately conservative approach is acceptable to us.

And what about the resolution on the Volhynia genocide?

I treat it as a response to the demand from voters, for example, from the kresy (borderlands) environment. In the recent history of our nations, there were no real Polish-Ukrainian relations in society. We are basing things on stereotypes, and the worst ones at that.

Everyone Fears Azov. But Why?

Your party raises concerns not only in Poland but also in Ukraine itself. Azov already has military power at its disposal, and now it may also have political power. Soldiers I spoke to on the front laugh, saying the government in Kyiv fears Azov’s tanks.

We are not a military-political movement. This is the official stance of Biletsky and the entire party. First and foremost, we are citizens and volunteers. We have many soldiers from that regiment, so of course, we have some connections. We don’t want to go to Kyiv on tanks. There are such speculations in government and presidential circles, but it is impossible for one regiment to lead a coup in a country with 40 million people. The government’s fear doesn’t concern just Azov, but all volunteers: the Donbas battalions or the Aidar battalion. They are supposed to be some kind of anti-state, rebellious forces. They were indeed not very disciplined at times. That’s why, in a short time, criminal cases and various provocations occurred. Azov is disciplined. We haven’t had major issues like that. Except for a few, but considering the scale of the front and the number of people fighting there, these were literally isolated incidents.

Dr. Oleksandr Maslak. The founder of the party and the chief ideologist of Azov was killed by a truck carrying logs. Before his death, he gave us an interview. Here it is

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