On May 26, 2026, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy granted the honorary title “Named After the Heroes of the UPA” to the Separate Special Operations Center “North” of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In response, Polish President Karol Nawrocki initiated proceedings to revoke Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state decoration. Zelenskyy subsequently returned the award to Poland by the post. As a sign of solidarity, other Ukrainian politicians, including some who are politically opposed to President Zelenskyy, also renounced Polish honors they had previously received.
Is the diplomatic conflict between Poland and Ukraine purely ideological, or is it rooted in questions of national identity? Dr. Yulia Fil, a culturologist, offers an academic answer free of political judgments.
Historical Mythmaking and the Blind Spot of Historical Consciousness
There are relatively few professional historians in society, and most people perceive history through the lens of mythmaking. However, a historical myth should not be dismissed simply because it diverges from historical reality. Its purpose is to inspire, transmit values, and generate meaning, whereas the accurate reconstruction of historical events is the task of scholarly research rather than myth.
Historical symbols acquire new meanings within contemporary processes of mythmaking. For example, in Mongolia, Genghis Khan serves as the central symbol of the national historical myth. Yet honoring Genghis Khan as a national hero does not imply support for aggressive wars against other peoples, nor does it prevent objective historical research.
Similarly, the heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) function as symbols within contemporary Ukrainian mythmaking. In present-day Ukraine, few people associate the political program or historical practices of the UPA with current reality. Rather, the UPA survives in the national consciousness as a symbol of the struggle for Ukraine. This is also part of my own identity, and I cannot pretend otherwise. I still remember the emotions I experienced as a schoolchild after watching The Undefeated (Neskorenyi), a film about Roman Shukhevych and the UPA. Those childhood impressions inspired me to learn more about the armed struggle for Ukraine during and after the Second World War. Together with many other influences, they have become part of what makes me Ukrainian. This symbol is woven into the national unconscious of many Ukrainians, though not all. Such symbols may contribute to a selective approach to history, in which heroism, patriotism, and the struggle for independence are emphasized, while crimes, xenophobia, and other uncomfortable aspects of the past are minimized or rejected.
Thus, the discrepancy between historical myth and historical reality creates a blind spot in Ukrainian historical consciousness. It is precisely this blind spot that leads us to misunderstand the feelings of Poles. While we know about Genghis Khan’s conquests only from historical literature, the mass murders of civilians in Volhynia are real, contemporary history for Polish families, who know about the UPA’s crimes from the stories of their grandparents. This is the fundamental difference.
However, this raises an important question: does a blind spot in historical consciousness necessarily imply the loss of a moral position? Suppose a father is proud of his son and refuses to believe that his son could have committed a crime. Does the father’s moral blindness necessarily mean that he will refuse to acknowledge responsibility for his son’s actions? There are different answers depending on whether this blindness is driven by ideology.
A historical myth may be experienced both ideologically and existentially. One may take pride in national heroes without being aware of their crimes while remaining willing to assume historical responsibility if those crimes become known. This resembles a father who loves his son yet is prepared to acknowledge his son’s wrongdoing and accept responsibility for it. If such willingness is absent, then the cult of national heroes becomes exclusively ideological in nature. In that case, it resembles a father who denies his son’s guilt until the very end, regardless of the evidence presented to him.
National Identity, Psychological Defense Mechanisms, Egocentrism, and Ideology
The diplomatic conflict between Poland and Ukraine unfolds on the ideological plane, yet in the public sphere it is often portrayed as an interethnic conflict rooted in the national identities of Ukrainians and Poles. But is this really the case?
In reality, national identity may take either an ideological or an existential form. An ideological identity relies on a particular system of beliefs within a political framework, whereas an existential identity is grounded in a personal sense of belonging to a nation’s history, culture, and creative life. National identity may rest not only on existential experience but also on psychological defense mechanisms associated with egocentrism, whereby anything that calls this identity into question is perceived as a threat. When individuals fail to find existential grounds for self-identification, they may identify with external symbols or collective structures that enhance the significance of the ego. From a cultural studies perspective, the diplomatic conflict between Poland and Ukraine can therefore be interpreted as a conflict between the egocentric structures of two states.
The purpose of ideology is to shape and mobilize collective emotions–emotions that people are often unable or unwilling to renounce. Consequently, it is difficult to influence the views of those whose national identity is grounded primarily in ideological commitments. There is little point in debating with them or attempting to persuade them. When people perceive the history of their country solely through an ideological lens, they become incapable of experiencing historical responsibility or shame, and interethnic conflicts at the ideological level therefore become irresolvable. Such conflicts, however, may be overcome on the existential level. My own experience confirms that, in personal interactions between Poles and Ukrainians, conflicts connected with national identity are overcome.
National Identity and Its Existential Foundations
How does an existential conversation between a Ukrainian and a Pole begin in everyday life? Often with the words: “Our politicians are wrong; please forgive us for them.” Of course, this does not happen everywhere, but there are people who distinguish between these two spheres: the sphere of genuine human communication and the sphere of political pragmatism. In the socio-political realm, historians, politicians, and public figures are guided primarily by political considerations and are often unprepared for this kind of dialogue. In both Ukraine and Poland, those who are capable of such dialogue constitute a minority. They do not engage in fruitless arguments, which is one reason they remain less visible in public discourse.
Existential identity presupposes that a person honestly accepts the history of their country and experiences the full range of emotions associated with it – shame, regret, pain, joy, respect, and pride in one’s culture. A hallmark of genuine national identity is the capacity to feel shame and responsibility for the darker chapters of that history. If a person does not experience these feelings, they identify not so much with history itself as with a particular ideology.
Another characteristic of national identity grounded in existential foundations is the absence of a fixed and completed image of Ukrainian culture imposed upon everyone in a static form. Existential national identity is self-sufficient: it is not confined by predetermined notions and does not depend on established templates. As a result, it remains dynamic, serves as a source of inspiration and creativity, and enables individuals to express their own experiences. At the same time, the ideologicalization of national identity is to some extent unavoidable. The question is one of degree, since any government–whether consciously or instinctively–seeks to shape the sphere of national identity in accordance with its ideological priorities. During wartime, moreover, ideological considerations often overshadow everything else.
There can be little doubt that, despite the ideological influences intensified by war, Ukrainian identity possesses an existential foundation, if only because Ukrainian culture – the very basis of that identity – remains highly dynamic and creative. Across all artistic fields, it encompasses the full spectrum of genres and movements, as well as a wide variety of forms of expression, which at times provoke extremely heated debates within Ukrainian society–debates that Ukrainians themselves often call „srachi” (flame wars or shitstorms – intense public arguments or online feuds on the internet). I consider this to be the first and most telling sign of a genuine existential identity. By contrast, ideological identity and an ideologized culture are largely devoid of creative potential; they tend to be static and formulaic.
Historical Guilt and Responsibility
Do Ukrainians bear guilt for the darker chapters of their history? Guilt can only be individual: it arises from one’s own actions or inaction. Therefore, there can be no collective guilt for the history of one’s country. There can, however, be collective responsibility, which implies a moral obligation to adopt a certain attitude toward historical events.
The acknowledgment of responsibility is demonstrated precisely by its unconditional character. It expects nothing in return. Each side, regardless of the position taken by the other, recognizes responsibility for crimes committed in history and is prepared to apologize for them. For example, when, in personal conversations with Poles, I apologize for certain actions of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, I do not expect them to apologize for their president’s actions in response.
Do all Ukrainians bear collective historical responsibility, and for which specific events do they have a moral obligation to answer? Ukrainians live in different countries: some have retained Ukrainian citizenship, while others have not; some are adults, while others are children. Clearly, responsibility does not extend to everyone, but only to those who participate in a shared identity grounded in historical consciousness. Moreover, it concerns precisely those historical phenomena that shape this identity.
If we include the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) within our collective historical myth, then we must honestly accept its entire history – both its honorable and its shameful chapters – and assume responsibility for it. If we present our identification with this history to others, we must also be prepared for the descendants of the victims of our historical heroes to call upon us to acknowledge responsibility for their crimes.
Such an appeal does not in any way constitute interference with our right to decide for ourselves how to understand our own history or whom to honor as heroes. Nor does it imply that descendants are guilty of the actions of their ancestors. Rather, it is simply an appeal to the moral obligation to define one’s attitude toward one’s own history honestly, without replacing it with an ideological construct.
Read also at PostPravda.Info: „Is Volhynia solely a matter for historians? Responsibility is unconditional [OPINION]”
