Key Points and Summary – Up to 23 Russian drones crossed into Poland and Polish airspace on September 9, a pattern analysts say was no accident.
- By skirting Slovakia and Hungary while targeting Poland, Moscow sent a calibrated warning: Warsaw’s support for Ukraine carries risk and NATO’s Article 5 resolve is being tested.
- Prime Minister Donald Tusk urged calm, yet critics argue “life as normal” is no longer tenable. NATO’s Mark Rutte vowed allies will defend every inch, but rhetoric must be matched by economic, political, and military measures at scale.
- The incursion also taunted President Trump, challenging U.S. credibility. The next move will determine deterrence—or drift.
Beyond Ukraine: Is Putin Preparing for Action Against Poland?
Up to 23 Russian drones violated Polish airspace in the night of September 9. As military historian Phillips O’Brien concludes on the basis of the drones’ flight paths, “This was definitely a Russian attack. How do we know—well all the UAVs [Unmanned aerial vehicles] went into Poland—none went into the airspace of Russia’s allies Slovakia and Hungary…. The Russians were given their allies a wide berth and only attacking Poland. That cannot have been an accident…. I know Russian systems have high flaw rates—but 14 systems making their way into Poland had to be deliberate.”
Indeed, the violation of Polish airspace was a deliberate act of aggression, an attack, in my view. At the same time, the small number of drones clearly suggests that the attack was not meant to start a war, but to signal to Poland, NATO, and Donald Trump that Russia could, if it wanted to, start a war.
The attack was a signal.
Poland was being warned that its support of Ukraine could lead to a serious Russian escalation, perhaps by additional drones, perhaps by missiles, perhaps by infantry and armor in Poland’s north. Russia’s illegitimate president, Vladimir Putin, was telling Poland that Russia had the capability and will to expand its war against Ukraine to Poland.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk remarked that, although “The situation is serious”… “there is no reason to panic.” True. Where Tusk erred was in concluding that “Life will continue as normal.” No, it won’t. Poland is now a target of Russian warmongering, and life for Poles will never be the same. NATO was being tested about the seriousness of its Article 5 commitment to respond to an armed attack on one of its members militarily, and not with unctuous sermons and expressions of concern.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte spoke well in his response to the attack: “Allies expressed solidarity with Poland and denounced Russia’s reckless behaviour. … What is clear is that the violation last night is not an isolated incident. … Allies are resolved to defend every inch of Allied territory.”
NATO Must Respond
Realizing that Europe’s security is dependent on Ukraine’s security, Rutte also noted that “Russia is waging a dangerous war of aggression against Ukraine that continually targets civilians and civilian infrastructure. Allies are determined to step up their support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s escalating campaign.”
But, while solidarity, resolve, and determination are nice, they won’t defend Ukraine and Poland or deter Putin. And if NATO can’t or won’t respond with appropriate economic, political, and military measures, then its future will be very much in doubt. Finally, the attack was a poke in Trump’s eye.
Putin signaled the US president that he doesn’t take him and America seriously, that they are lightweights who can be ridiculed, insulted, and provoked at will. And who will be too terrified to respond. In effect, Putin is telling Trump that he’s a weak-kneed president. It’s now up to the US president to prove Putin wrong.
About the Author
Dr. Alexander Motyl, Rutgers University Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”
