The Peace Dividend is paid by the US. The Golden Age of Europe is Over [ANALYSIS]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the peace dividend was highly flaunted but ultimately frangible. There was no uniform distribution. The benefits depended on where states fit within the grand game.

In western Europe, governments could disburden themselves from militarizing their budgets. Shielded by the umbrella of a dominant US protection force, foreign policies emphasized markets over collective defense.  The exuberance over a potential vast consumer market, an untapped cheap labor pool, investment opportunities, and Russia’s trove of raw materials excited the financial and commercial sectors and drove decisions in Paris and Berlin.

The former Soviet Bloc members realized a long-sought freedom from a monolithic and oppressive state. Free from censorship and open to instate democratic institutions and reforms, former SSRs and Eastern Bloc nations democratized their economies.

Russia became the eighth member of the G-8 and joined North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Despite the signals, Paris and Berlin were in denial about the pivot taking place in Moscow even while Putin was conducting active measures, irregular warfare operations, computer hacking, and assassination overseas and in the near abroad. Western Europe’s transactional approach persisted even though Putin’s exploits were making it clear the thinking was delusional.

The sense liberation spread and as color revolutions arose Kremlin elites were terror-struck.  The mass protests in Moscow, Maidan Square and the arrival of the Arab Spring created a specter of regime change.

As counsel Putin relied on his personal network of trusted colleagues from the security services. The siloviki, although often fractious and contentious, share a singular worldview. They believe that the interests of Russia need defending against the advances of globalization and the existential threat from the United States and NATO – by any means.

Such impulses led to the illegal war in Ukraine and set in motion a second Russia reset. The current security ontology educes a Cold War mindset.  Due to the incertitude of US support, Europe must focus on defending itself and reconstructing its conceptions of deterrence. 

The battle terrain has shifted for Russia as well.  It has lost its superpower status and, notwithstanding it nuclear capability, has devolved to a regional power. China as yet sees no self-interest in a Russian defeat, but has taken advantage of Putin’s ruinous special military operation to turn its Russian ally into a vassal – one of the kremlin’s worst fears.

Meanwhile, Olaf Scholz whose dithering help cost Ukraine weapons, time, and lives lost his reelection to Friedrich Merz who has pledge his county’s support for Ukraine. The German Ministry of Financed announced an aid package of 2.5 billion euros for 2025 and a commitment of an additional 8.2 billion for 2026 through 2029.

On NATO’s eastern flank Poland has taken a central role in western Europe’s deterrence and defense structure. While Poland becomes the fulcrum for ground forces, the addition of Finland and Sweden form with Poland and the Baltic states to make the Baltic Sea a NATO lake.

Other deterrents include:

• Estonia’s expansion of the  Defense League – its paramilitary force. Since Russia’s incursion into Ukraine the government has distributed a classified number of Swedish-made AK-4 automatic rifles to Estonian households.
• Sweden brought back a military draft in 2017 amid security concerns in the Baltic region. Germany, the Netherlands and others are considering Sweden’s system as a model
• Poland has instituted military training for all adult males
• Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, jointly asked their parliaments to approve a withdrawal from the international anti-personnel mines’ treaty to protect its borders with Russia and Belarus.
• Poland will spend 4.7% of GDP on defense as it hopes to build the largest land army in Europe eclipsing the UK and France

The Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic and now Sweden and Finland understand the peril and are remilitarizing.  Although France and Germany remain the central powers, Poland with Europe’s sixth largest economy is growing in influence and reshaping the balance.

Previously, the security concerns of the former eastern bloc had always been minimized and viewed as paranoid. Europe’s security establishment dismissed their fears and softened on its strategy of deterrence by alliance in favor of ‘tripwire’ and rapid reinforcement. Thus, prioritizing Russia’s security concerns above that of its eastern allies.

The frustration on the flank countries was palpable. The chair of the Estonian parliament’s foreign affairs committee noted: “It is incredible how the leaders of France and Germany are inadvertently paving the way for new acts of violence by Russia.”

When last week’s power outage and fire at Heathrow Airport occurred it not only called to mind Marko Mihkelson comment, it reminded many of another incident of nearly a year ago to the date. On March 20, 2024, Dylan Earl set fire on a Ukrainian-owned business in East London. He and his accomplices were charged with arson and acting on behalf of Russia.

During the Cold War, collective security was a foundational concept.  It underscored a sense of purpose and how we defined ourselves versus authoritarian societies. In the current morphology in Russian affairs, those values reecho. Unfortunately, as extremist movements rise and internal threats to liberal democracies mount, the question ‘who we are?’ is blurring.

Reconciling diverse political concerns, balancing commercial interests, addressing capability gaps, coordinating weapon infrastructures are no mean task. Further, the loss of the American security blanket makes the current moment more than a mere inflection point. It puts us in the middle of a sea change.

Europe will have to view itself as the new “city on the hill”. The distribution of peace dividends has been recalled, and the time has arrived for a renewed investment of resources and political will.

Jack Jarmon has taught international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and Rutgers University where he was Associate Director and Research Professor at the Command Control and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis. During the mid 1990s, he served as USAID Technical Advisor for the Russian government. He has lectured at major universities and war colleges and authored and co-authored five books, which are currently core texts for international and security studies programs in the US and abroad.