Can a citizen of an aggressor state be a political agency if their entire country is working toward war? For now, we can speak only of the possibility of manifesting political agency – and only if that agency is directed toward achieving a military victory over the aggressor. Are the candidates currently being nominated to the Russian platform at PACE prepared for this?
The Formation of the Russian Platform at PACE
In March 2022, in response to aggression against Ukraine, Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe, of which it had been a member for nearly 26 years. The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 with the aim of protecting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and today it brings together 46 states. It is a values-based legal organization rather than an economic or political union: it does not adopt laws for its member states and operates through a system of conventions, among which the European Convention on Human Rights is of key importance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) oversees the implementation of the Convention by considering complaints of its violations. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) is a consultative body composed of representatives of the parliaments of all member states.
Although PACE has lost the Russian delegation, it retains a mandate to protect human rights with regard to citizens of the Russian Federation. The mandate of the Council of Europe is not limited exclusively to its member states, since it is a values-based human rights organization rather than an interstate union. From this perspective, Russia’s expulsion does not nullify the rights of Russians, which remain subject to protection. It was precisely this position that formed the basis for the adoption, on October 1, 2025, of a resolution to establish a platform for dialogue with Russian opposition, anti-war, and democratic groups located outside Russia.
The Russian platform at PACE is envisioned not as a representative body but as an expert, human rights, and consultative body. Its participants will not be full members of PACE with voting rights; however, they will be able to take part in discussions and events and to attend meetings of PACE committees in a limited capacity. The creation of such a platform appears logical, since a significant number of Russians who have broken with Putin’s Russia reside in Europe, and at present they lack their own form of representation.
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Competition Among Different Russian Opposition Groups
Representatives of the Russian opposition may nominate their delegates to the platform; however, since an election procedure is technically impossible, the decision on its composition will be approved on the basis of a PACE resolution – upon the proposal of the President and with the approval of the Assembly’s Bureau. The nomination process is currently underway, involving opposition representatives who hold opposing positions. On the one hand, there are representatives of national movements advocating withdrawal from the Russian Federation; on the other, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who defends Russia’s territorial integrity and categorically opposes granting independence to anyone. On the one hand, there is the political wing of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC), which is conducting armed struggle against Russian occupiers in Ukraine; on the other, Vladimir Kara-Murza, who advocates nonviolent methods of resistance to the Putin regime.
Competition among the various groups has escalated into an open conflict between Garry Kasparov and Vladimir Kara-Murza, rooted in incompatible concepts that have become a dividing line within the Russian opposition. The emotions stirred by the polemics spilled into the public sphere, and on December 13, on Alexander Plyushchev’s YouTube channel The Breakfast Show, Vladimir Milov – vice president of the American public organization Free Russia Foundation – accused Garry Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky of conspiracy, deliberate provocation, and “mafia-oligarchic bullying” against another vice president of the same organization, Vladimir Kara-Murza. A few days later, Vladimir Kara-Murza appeared on the same channel, followed by Garry Kasparov. Setting aside the subjective assessments and emotions of each side, let us examine the ideological disagreements that have divided the Russian opposition.
Whom Should the Russian Platform at PACE Represent?
Vladimir Kara-Murza advocates the broadest possible representation of various currents of the Russian opposition within the platform and considers it offensive that participation may be limited to those who are outside Russia. On the one hand, this sounds logical, since national delegations to PACE are required to include representatives of all political parties represented in their parliaments. This is precisely the organization’s concept.
However, Garry Kasparov proceeds from a different premise: since Russia has been expelled from the Council of Europe, no political forces claiming to represent Russia can participate in PACE’s work. Consequently, in his view, the Russian platform at PACE should represent those who have broken ties with Putin’s Russia. It is precisely these people who have found themselves without any representation, and it is their interests, Kasparov argues, that must be defended.
According to Garry Kasparov, a break with Putin’s Russia implies abandoning the use of the Russian state tricolor under which Russia is waging war against Ukraine. Instead, the white–blue–white flag of the Russian opposition is now being used. However, supporters of the so-called “Beautiful Russia of the Future” hold a different position. Thus, on March 1, 2025, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya Yashin, and Yulia Navalnaya organized the “Russia Against Putin” march in Berlin, where, among other flags, Russian state tricolors were also present.
Before the rally, many Russians urged the organizers to exclude the use of the flag under which Ukrainians are being killed. I, too, openly addressed Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin in the only way available to me – through their Facebook pages. All appeals – both mine and those of others – were ignored. For this reason, I do not believe in the sincerity of Vladimir Kara-Murza’s claims about supporting broad representation of Russians if he refuses to engage in dialogue on fundamentally important issues even with fellow émigrés like himself.
Everyone Is Against the War, but Not Everyone Is for Ukraine’s Victory
Vladimir Kara-Murza is an advocate of nonviolent methods of struggle. “Methods are no less important than the goal,” he stated on Alexander Plyushchev’s program, adding, “It is a Stalinist and Soviet principle that the end justifies the means.” He declined to give any assessment of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the “Freedom of Russia” Legion fighting for Ukraine. When the host asked whether he would support arms supplies to Ukraine in conversations with Americans and Europeans, he replied: “I do not consider myself an expert in military matters.”
By contrast, Garry Kasparov unequivocally supports military assistance to Ukraine. “The fight against Putin today is the fight for Ukraine’s victory. There is nothing else that can be done today,” he said in a conversation with Alexander Plyushchev, adding: “We ran a major campaign lobbying for this Ukrainian aid package – 61 billion dollars. … The FBK (the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny – author’s note) considers military assistance unacceptable. We believe help should be provided in every possible way.”
As for the sentiments of opposition-minded Russians themselves, they can be judged only on the basis of poll results conducted by Alexander Plyushchev during his programs, and these polls showed that Vladimir Kara-Murza enjoys far greater support than Garry Kasparov.
Is Political Agency Possible for a Citizen of an Aggressor State?
People living under bombardment are unlikely to understand calls for resistance through nonviolent methods. But that is not the main issue. To take the position of Russian opposition figures seriously, one must first answer the question: do they possess political agency at all?
Agency is the ability to act independently. The war against Ukraine is not only the work of the Russian authorities, but of Russia as a whole. Many Russians support Ukraine, but they do not constitute a new collective agency that could be called “another Russia.” Moreover, by remaining in Russia, they become part of a system that works for the war and thereby lose their agency.
Russian political organizations in exile are few in number: most émigrés do not claim a distinct Russian political agency and seek to integrate into the societies in which they live. Many face legal difficulties and, of course, need assistance; for consultative and human-rights work within the framework of the Russian platform at PACE, professionals will be required – professionals who can quite well function without political agency.
The agency of national delegations at PACE is based on political movements that have won elections and have the right to represent a country. Russia was expelled from PACE for crimes; therefore, participants in the Russian platform cannot claim either a legal or a moral right to speak on behalf of Russia. If a Russian opposition figure declares that they speak in Russia’s name, they lose their agency. It is possible that this is precisely what prompted objections from the Ukrainian delegation to the creation of the platform. Nevertheless, it did not block the initiative in exchange for a promise: one third of the participants would come from movements of Indigenous peoples advocating decolonization. This position can be read as follows: we do not regard Russians as politically agentive, but we hope that distinct political agency will emerge in the future. To be agentive means to be a subject of action. Political agency for a citizen of an aggressor state is possible only on the basis of fighting military aggression – and in no other way. There is a fundamental difference between the positions “against the war” and “for Ukraine’s victory.” All the more so when being “against the war” means proposing to fight only by nonviolent methods – this is merely an imitation of action, producing at best an illusion of political agency. For this reason, I do not consider Vladimir Kara-Murza to be politically agentive, regardless of his personal merits. A form of agency separate from Russia for the opposition – including future participants of the platform at PACE – can arise only through a struggle not only against the regime, but also for Ukraine’s military victory.
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