Africa has long been an important arena for the Kremlin to extend Russian influence around the globe. Moscow simultaneously deploys the military, mercenaries, media, and diplomacy, while also developing a much less visible tool of influence—the network of the Russian Orthodox Church. In late August, Constantine, Metropolitan of Cairo and North Africa and Patriarchal Exarch of Africa, visited Kenya, where he met with local church structures and consecrated a church in the town of Nyabigege. What lies behind these seemingly harmless activities?
- Russia’s long-standing ties with Africa weakened after the fall of communism, as the country turned toward the West. The continent returned to the spotlight following Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent deterioration of relations with the US and Europe.
- Established in December 2021, the Moscow exarchate was created after Africa’s traditional Patriarchate of Alexandria recognized the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine, triggering a feud between Moscow and Alexandria.
- “However, once the Moscow church establishes its foothold in Africa, such networks will not remain merely religious. The influence they accumulate creates opportunities to shape attitudes, values, and political choices among local societies,” says Yurii Tokar, Ukraine’s ambassador to Kenya, in an interview with PostPravda.Info.
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Africa and Moscow’s spiritual colonialism
By early 2025, Russia’s African Exarchate claimed around 350 parishes in 34 countries and more than 260 clergy members, the vast majority of whom are African. This was achieved in under three years—back in 2022, the Moscow church operated in just four countries. Today, more than 100 priests are active in Kenya alone. The expansion continues into 2026. Russia is recruiting local priests and sending African students to Russian seminaries. In June 2026, five more clergymen from Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, and Zimbabwe were ordained after completing their theological training in Moscow.
During his two-week trip in August, Exarch Constantine presided over divine services in parishes across nine deaneries throughout Kenya. He performed the rite of consecration for three churches in the Vihiga, Nandi, and Migori deaneries, and blessed the cornerstones for the construction of six future churches as well as a new school. Two clean water fountains were dedicated, and progress was inspected on the construction of four additional churches, as well as the condition of the completed orphanage buildings and several schools.
Furthermore, in the Nyeri deanery, Metropolitan Constantine visited the construction site of the Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa’s first clinic. The project is being carried out with the support of the Foundation for the Preservation of Christian Culture and Heritage, and according to the Exarchate’s official statement, it “marks the beginning of the Russian Orthodox Church’s healthcare activities on the African continent.”
During his stay in Kenya, Constantine ordained another candidate from the Ivory Coast to the diaconate and the priesthood, received a priest from the Orthodox Church of Alexandria into the Russian Orthodox Church, administered the sacrament of baptism to twenty local residents, and received five more individuals into Orthodoxy.
In all deaneries, Metropolitan Constantine organized pastoral meetings and interviews with candidates for seminary studies, as well as presented parishes with icons and liturgical vessels. All deaneries in Kenya received gifts of motorcycles, cows, and office equipment to assist them in their pastoral and daily work.
Meanwhile, Russian Orthodox churches in South Africa draw their members primarily from the Afrikaans community, whose conservative values appeal to a portion of this group; however, they are also seeking to expand their ranks by offering missionary programs to rural and Black communities. According to Tom Southern, director of special projects at the UK-based Centre for Information Resilience, this expansion aims to “try to pull more countries into their orbit. It’s like a spiritual colonialism,” the specialist was quoted as saying by Bloomberg.
“Ukraine’s experience shows that the Russian Orthodox Church can no longer be viewed simply as a religious institution operating independently from the state. It has become an integral part of Russia’s political and ideological machinery,” stated Ukraine’s Ambassador to Kenya, Yurii Tokar, in an interview with PostPravda.Info.
Africa as the apple of Putin’s eye
Vladimir Putin recently established a department tasked with coordinating Russia’s interactions and policies with countries selected by the Kremlin. A special team will be appointed to handle policy toward Africa, as Bloomberg reported in February 2026.
There is also a visible emphasis on linguistic and cultural issues. Russia has opened seven Russian Houses across the continent and is planning more, including in Namibia. The Russian language is being introduced as an official language of instruction in cities such as Abidjan in the Ivory Coast and Harare in Zimbabwe. In 2024, a foundation headed by Putin’s daughter, Katerina Tikhonova, helped establish a study program at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal, to facilitate Russian language instruction.
Over 32,000 students from Africa are currently studying at Russian universities, as officially announced in December 2025 by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Since 2020, the number of Russian scholarships awarded on the African continent has nearly tripled, reaching over 5,300 spots. Russia is following in the footsteps of the USSR, which also used education to draw in many African leaders. The Russian embassy in South Africa, for example, assists with arrangements to study at Moscow’s Synergy University. This is the largest private university in Russia.
Mobilization for the war against Ukraine
According to European Parliament reports on Russia’s expansion in Africa, Moscow has military cooperation agreements with 43 African nations and serves as a key arms supplier on the continent. Paramilitary troops from the Wagner Group fought rebels in countries such as Mali, although the unit was ultimately officially disbanded to integrate it into the government-run Africa Corps.
Companies affiliated with the Wagner Group hold security contracts across the continent. They are also involved in the operations of oil companies and gold mining. “African countries possess immense economic and human potential and are playing an increasingly important role in global politics,” Putin said in a speech delivered at the plenary session of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum in Cairo in December 2025.
Sergey Lavrov announced during the same event that Russia plans to launch trade missions in 15 African countries by the end of 2026. In January, a Russian warship took part in naval exercises off the coast of South Africa alongside units from China, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The Russian embassy maintained at the time that the exercises were focused on maritime security.
Information, disinformation, propaganda, and influence
Alongside these hard power tactics come soft power measures. The Russian state news agency Sputnik employs South African journalists and plans to open a bureau in the country in 2026. After Ethiopia, this would mark the second bureau for the Kremlin’s propaganda outlet in Africa. “Our main goal, as always, is to provide an alternative source of information,” said Viktor Anokhin in an interview with Bloomberg. He is set to build Sputnik’s structures in Africa. Anokhin was born in South Africa and later moved to the Russian Federation to study at Moscow State Linguistic University. He describes his own interests as focusing on true African identity in modern politics and African culture as a way to oppose the global neoliberal agenda.
Russian propaganda refers to the establishment of Kremlin-controlled media in Africa as a “balanced offering.” Meanwhile, reports from organizations such as the European Council on Foreign Relations reveal that Russia has sponsored disinformation campaigns and stoked instability in conflict-ridden African nations.
Russia is also accused of exploiting residents from numerous African countries to support its war effort in Ukraine. We have also previously reported on Kremlins’ military recruitment in Africa at PostPravda.Info.
Read too: From Nairobi to the Battlefield: How Kenyan Job Seekers Were Tricked Into Russia’s War
One such recruitment agency was Alabuga Start in Tatarstan. It offered jobs in hospitality and construction to thousands of African women between the ages of 18 and 22. However, reports from the US-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) state that most of these women ended up in military equipment factories within the Russian Federation.
Ukraine estimates that more than 1,400 Africans are fighting on the battlefield on Russia’s side. Kenya’s Minister of Foreign Affairs reported in November that at least 200 Kenyans had been recruited into the Russian army. A report published by All Eyes on Wagner, an independent research group, stated that Russia has recruited individuals from roughly 35 African countries and listed the names of around 300 confirmed Africans who died fighting for Russia.
Read also: Putin “Has All the Cards”, but most of them are jokers [ANALYSIS]
In South Africa, where fighting for or supporting a foreign military is a criminal offense, the daughter of former President Jacob Zuma is being investigated by police for allegedly helping recruit around 20 men into the Russian military. She had reportedly assured them they were attending a security guard training course. South Africa, Kenya, and Botswana are conducting a series of investigations into their citizens’ involvement in fighting on Russia’s side.
An investigation conducted in September 2024 by the Jamestown Foundation revealed that African students who traveled to Russia through programs linked to the Russian Orthodox Church were also recruited into the Russian Armed Forces—despite initially arriving for religious studies or construction work.
The report stated that students originating from countries including Kenya, Burundi, Cameroon, Madagascar, and Uganda were identified among Russian forces in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Ukraine’s Ambassador to Kenya emphasizes that the Moscow church helps legitimize Russia’s war against Ukraine. “Religion dictated by Moscow reinforces its state narratives abroad and increasingly serves as an additional channel of influence alongside diplomacy, politics, and information,” stated Yurii Tokar.
The African Exarchate, however, claims that it does not recruit African residents for military service and rejects allegations that its clergy encourages people to go to the front. The Church maintains that its mission in Africa is strictly religious. However, video recordings have surfaced showing priests praying for Russian soldiers, as well as for the Africa Corps or the Wagner private military company in West Africa, suggesting close cooperation between the military and the Church, notes the newspaper The EastAfrican.
Tokar also points to another crucial aspect of Russia’s expansion in Africa. “Africa represents 54 nations and 54 votes in international forums, including the UN. On top of that, it possesses vast natural resources, rapidly growing economies, a young demographic, and increasing political weight. For Moscow, this means not only access to raw materials, new markets, and partners, but also the ability to break through international isolation through dozens of bilateral relationships and the construction of a lasting network of influence,” the Ukrainian ambassador tells PostPravda.Info.
Therefore, in his view, it is not merely about classic propaganda broadcast from Moscow to Africa. Increasingly, it is about building intermediaries—local clergy, teachers, students, journalists, social media influencers, or community leaders—who over time become carriers of Russian narratives themselves. “And that is precisely what is most characteristic of the Russian model. It is not the mere use of soft power—since all nations do that—but the way Moscow combines different channels of influence, reinforces them mutually, and gradually roots them locally. As a result, the message no longer needs to come directly from Russia. It can be repeated by a local clergyman, a graduate of a Russian university, an expert, a journalist, an influencer, or a community leader. And then it stops looking like Russian propaganda—it begins to function as part of the local debate. That is what makes such a model significantly more durable and much harder to identify,” Tokar adds.
