Russia’s Information War in Africa: Africans Are Going to Fight Against Ukraine

Russia declared itself the legal successor of the Soviet Union and appropriated its image as a fighter against colonialism – an image that still resonates in many African countries today. The Soviet Union actively used anti-colonial rhetoric to promote Marxist ideology in Africa and supported Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress in its struggle against apartheid. Responsibility for overseeing the anti-apartheid agenda was entrusted by the Soviet leadership to Ukraine (then the Ukrainian SSR), which became a member of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid. Nevertheless, it is not Ukraine but Russia itself – now attempting to reclaim its former colonial possessions by military force – that is associated in many African countries with the struggle against colonialism. This clear success of Russian propaganda has resulted in an influx of African mercenaries into the Russian army. Journalist Arden Arkman investigated this issue for the online publication The Insider.

Alongside its military presence, Russia has been expanding its informational influence in Africa. To this end, in 2023 it created a media platform called “African Initiative” to promote pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives across the continent. Individuals previously connected to Wagner-linked media structures were reportedly involved in the project. At the same time, Russia has been promoting the social network Afree as an alternative to Western social media platforms – a supposedly “pan-African” online platform. Through these structures, Russia recruits mercenaries in Africa for the war against Ukraine.

All of this activity is shielded by the anti-colonial image previously cultivated by the Soviet Union – and this is nothing new. What is new, as Arden Arkman demonstrates in his investigation, is that Russian propaganda now actively uses the Orthodox Church even in Africa and appeals to so-called “traditional values,” contrasting them with the values of modern civilization. Contemporary Russian propaganda, even in Africa, differs from Soviet propaganda in its archaic style. Without inventing anything fundamentally new, it reproduces in Africa’s information space the same anti-Ukrainian narratives that it spreads within Russia itself.

Many Africans believe that it was not Russia that attacked Ukraine, but rather that the West unleashed a war against Russia using Ukraine as its proxy. The author of the investigation supports this claim with statements from ordinary Africans from various countries whom he was able to find through social media.

The author avoids arbitrary generalizations, demonstrating that the reasons for and social basis of support for Russia can vary greatly from one African country to another. It should also be noted that within each country, attitudes toward Russia and Ukraine may differ significantly across various social groups. For example, Nigerian writer and Nobel Prize laureate in Literature (1986) Wole Soyinka published a collection of essays in 2023 titled The Putin Files: Excursions Around the Ideology of Pain. In it, he examines the war against Ukraine in the context of the ideology of violence in contemporary Russia – a feudal, terrorist state under Putin’s leadership. In his view, this war is a human catastrophe that will have grave consequences for the entire African continent; moreover, the fate of the world depends on its outcome, which is why Africans should condemn it and have every right to intervene in Putin’s affairs.

The spread of Russian influence is also facilitated by social factors, including poverty. Sociological studies show varying levels of sympathy toward Russia in different African countries depending on their history, social structure, and level of economic development. Many countries were previously under the influence of the Soviet Union and even proclaimed a course toward building socialism. Their populations tend to transfer their attitudes toward the Soviet Union onto modern Russia, without considering that Ukraine also made a significant contribution to the assistance the Soviet Union provided to African countries. Moreover, pro-Russian sentiments are strong even in such a democratic country as Kenya, which was never part of Russia’s sphere of influence.

Below, with the author’s permission, are excerpts from Arden Arkman’s investigation “Kremlin-style colonialism: Russian propaganda is actively preparing Africans for military service in Ukraine,” presented in summarized form. The full text of the investigation in English and Russian can be found on the website of the online publication The Insider.

Arden Arkman. Russia is recruiting mercenaries in Africa for the war against Ukraine

This past February, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry stated that at least 1,700 Africans from dozens of countries were fighting on the Russian side.

In February 2026, the Geneva-based investigative group IMPACT, which tracks Russian recruitment networks, reported that it had obtained several files containing lists of recruited Africans, including a more comprehensive database with information on 1,417 citizens from 35 countries.

The largest number of recruits came from Egypt (361 people), Cameroon (335), and Ghana (234). A separate IMPACT list contains the names of 316 African recruits who were killed in combat. The highest number of deaths was recorded among citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt. In Gambia, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, dozens of cases of recruited individuals returning home have also been documented.

In Kenya, on feb. 18, the country’s parliamentary majority leader Kimani Ichung’wah stated during debates that his fellow citizens were being deceived through promises of civilian employment into serving as cannon fodder in a foreign war.

Later, in comments to local media, he stressed that recruits were being sent into combat with virtually no training: “Some were trained for only nine days. They are simply handed weapons and sent off to die.” The remarks came after the release of a report by Kenya’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), excerpts of which were published by Reuters. According to the document, more than 1,000 Kenyan men had been recruited – at the time, at least 39 had been hospitalized with injuries, 28 were missing in action, and 89 were still on the front line.

Ghana’s foreign minister confirmed the deaths of 55 Ghanaian citizens who had also been lured to Russia with promises of employment, only to be sent to the front lines.

Potential recruits are required to be between the ages of 18 and 55. They are promised access to an “official state program” offering financial and social support. Recruiters assist them with visa applications and arrange and pay for flights to Russia, often to the city of Ufa.

The recruiters’ contact details also lead to an advertisement posted on the VKontakte page of a woman identified as Darya Artyomovna. Her profile description states: “Information support and coordination center for the volunteer movement of the Republic of Bashkortostan. Current programs, guarantees, payments.”

In August 2025, her page featured a post showing a photograph of dark-skinned men with suitcases alongside the message: “We invite you to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense in the city of Ufa! We also accept citizens from countries beyond the near abroad: China, Colombia, Africa, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, the CIS, etc. Foreign military personnel WITHOUT knowledge of the Russian language!” The post promises tickets and visas, although the payments offered are more modest: a one-time payment of 1.4–1.7 million rubles ($19,000-$23,000)  and a monthly salary of 230,000–260,000 rubles ($3,100-3,500)

In one of her posts, Darya explains why foreigners choose to serve in what Russia calls the “special military operation.” One of the factors she cites is “historical memory,” writing that “People from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Latin America, and Africa believe that Russia has always helped in the fight against external aggression.”

Speaking to The Insider, political scientist and African studies specialist Irina Filatova recalled how, in South Africa, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, one of the daughters of former President Jacob Zuma, was accused of recruiting men to participate in Russia’s war against Ukraine: “They thought they were going to security training courses, but instead ended up at the front. The government did everything it could to get them out because the situation became public. But some had already been killed or maimed.” Following the accusations, Zuma-Sambudla voluntarily resigned her parliamentary seat.

After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the dismantling of his media structures, Russia began rebuilding its system of informational influence in Africa. A key element of this new propaganda architecture is the “African Initiative” (AI), a media project established in Moscow in September 2023.

According to findings published by investigators in May 2025, the organization also promotes the “Africa Corps,” the successor to Wagner, and several figures involved in African Initiative’s operations were affiliated with Prigozhin’s “Lakhta Center.”

African Initiative operates as a full-fledged media outlet, with versions in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, as well as a Telegram channel. Articles published on the website are reposted to the Telegram channel and then distributed across dozens of affiliated groups and communities.

Social situation in Africa

In Kenya GDP per capita grew by 43% between 2005 and 2022, while the share of the population living below the national poverty line declined from 46.8% to 39.8% over. Nevertheless, according to World Bank forecasts, more than 43% of Kenyans will still be living in poverty in 2026.

Kenyan human rights activist Otieno N. told The Insider that poverty is the main factor driving Africans to fight for the Russian army. Otieno says that before the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, former Kenyan servicemen sometimes found work in Russia in spheres connected to the private security industry. However, after 2022, numerous agencies luring young, unemployed Kenyans with promises of jobs abroad emerged. According to Otieno, corrupt local officials may have received payments from agencies that profited from the “fees” charged to men seeking employment opportunities.

In the comments under a Facebook post about Kenyan men recruited into the Russian army, users write that they, too, would like to contact recruiters and go to war. Many of these users, according to their profiles, live in Kenya and other African countries.

Other comments include statements such as: “the unemployment situation in Kenya is deadly,” “better to die in battle than die poor, drowning in poverty, I need a job, help me,” and “better to die for a purpose in life than to live uselessly with empty hope here in Kenya… I wish West Africans dying in deserts and at sea trying to reach Europe would also take advantage of this opportunity.”

Nigerian Ib is convinced that “80% of young people” in Nigeria – and across the continent – would embrace such an opportunity “with open arms”: “We believe it is better to die earning money than to sit at home and be killed for nothing. Everyone knows that the offer from Russia is a golden opportunity to build a better life back home in the future.” Among his friends are several Nigerian soldiers who want to defect to the Russian army.

African sympathies for Russia

Irina Filatova also notes that in South Africa and in some West African countries where Wagner mercenaries previously trained local armed forces, some people may indeed travel to Russia voluntarily, including to the front line, out of political sympathy alone: “Several factors come together here: Russia is popular, I’m going to do a good thing, and I’ll also be well paid – so everything seems wonderful.”

Attitudes toward Russia across the African continent vary significantly from country to country. In 2024–2025, the research service Afrobarometer conducted a survey involving more than 50,000 respondents from 38 African countries. Participants were asked to assess Russia’s political and economic influence.

The results showed that 36% of respondents viewed Russia’s influence as “somewhat/very positive,” while 23% described it as “somewhat/very negative.” Around 42% were unable to give a definite answer. In Central Africa, roughly half of respondents expressed sympathy toward Russia, with 43% in West Africa, 27% in Southern Africa, and 26% in East Africa expressing similar sentiments.

At the country level, the most positive attitudes toward Russia were recorded in Mali (80% of respondents) and Cameroon (60%). The war in Ukraine did not significantly worsen perceptions of Russia: in 24 countries, researchers recorded an increase of around three percentage points in positive assessments compared with the 2019–2021 period.

Irina Filatova describes West Africa – particularly the Central African Republic – as the region most friendly toward Russia, while South Africa also remains relatively close. Kenya, in her view, is more distant: “At the UN, it did not always vote with Russia, and it did not even always abstain.”

Russia is using the Soviet anti-colonial narrative while overlooking Ukraine’s role

“Russia is also expanding its influence through propaganda built around a continent-wide narrative: ‘This is about the Soviet Union’s assistance in anti-colonial struggles, in the fight against apartheid and imperialism. Russia presents itself as the defender of the Global South, fighting oppression and advocating for a multipolar world,’” Irina Filatova explains.

The continent-wide narrative promoted by Russian propaganda centers on the Soviet Union’s support for anti-colonial struggles and the fight against apartheid and imperialism

Filatova believes the specific reasons for sympathy toward Russia vary from country to country. In South Africa, narratives of Soviet assistance remain especially influential: the USSR is still regarded as a friend of both South Africa and the ruling African National Congress, as well as “those who are still in power or only recently left office.” When it comes to West Africa, Filatova agrees with Zalmayev that there is a strong anti-French element in Russian propaganda and that Moscow’s influence is particularly strong in former French colonies.

Peter Zalmayev also points to strong nostalgia across the continent for Soviet-African ties, especially in South Africa. According to him, that past is associated primarily with Russia, even though Ukraine, in his words, “played second fiddle in this alliance.” As he explains it: “More than half of the doctors, engineers, and other members of the intelligentsia in Mozambique during the 1970s were from Ukraine.” He argues that this history needs to be discussed more openly in order to counter anti-Ukrainian narratives promoted by Russian propaganda and Moscow’s attempts to appropriate the Soviet legacy.

Zalmayev notes that Ukraine faces greater difficulty promoting its narratives because Kyiv’s diplomatic presence on the continent is objectively much weaker than Moscow’s: Ukraine has only 17 embassies in Africa, while Russia has 54, having inherited the Soviet diplomatic network.

In Mali, Zalmayev says, anti-Western sentiment is particularly intense: “Even for someone arriving from the West, it would be unsafe there.” Tanzania, meanwhile, has an authoritarian regime that maintains close ties with both Russia and China. Kenya, by contrast, remains “an island of democracy” with a large and active media landscape.

Irina Filatova describes the situation in many of the countries where Russia has expanded its influence and where Wagner forces have operated – a list that includes the Central African Republic, Mali, Chad, and Niger – as catastrophic: “These are extremely underdeveloped and impoverished regions, marked by deep tensions between local populations and Islamist groups that regularly attack villagers, kill those they dislike, and fight governments for control over enormous natural resources. Russian military personnel apparently receive some share of those resources in exchange for protecting these regimes.”

The Role of the Orthodox Church and the Appeal to Traditional Values

In Kenya, as Code for Africa notes, emphasis is placed primarily on soft-power tools, including the network of Russian Orthodox Church parishes – 37 in total across the country – which researchers describe as one of the channels of Russian influence. In Nigeria, the Russian Orthodox Church also operates several parishes that Code for Africa suspects of cooperating with influencers. There, the operation also includes planting material in local newspapers and countering anti-government protests. According to the researchers, the overall effect of these activities has been to protect the interests of coup leaders in the Sahel, fuel anti-Western sentiment, and increase sympathy for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.

Another narrative, more widespread in Southern and Central Africa, revolves around the promotion of traditional values, which many on the continent perceive as being similar to Russia’s own: “There is an emphasis on the religious values of Africans, resistance to the dominance of Western mentality, and opposition to the imposition of Western norms and rules. And in all of this, Russia presents itself as helping Africa.”

During training, Africans undergo not only intensive military instruction but also the sacrament of baptism into the Orthodox faith.

The priest communicated with them “through a Serbian brother” who spoke English and French. The Africans apparently came to the idea of baptism rather quickly. “After a brief introduction (by an Orthodox priest) about myself and the Orthodox faith, with the help of our Serbian brother, they were baptized.”

What do Africans themselves say?

According to Filatova, propaganda in Africa is spread using almost exactly the same language as in Russia itself. It generally consists of narratives about Russia’s “invincible strength” and supposed battlefield “successes,” along with hostile statements about Volodymyr Zelensky and other demonstrably false information. As a result, in countries where Russian influence is strong, many people develop pro-Russian attitudes, especially regarding the causes of the war against Ukraine.

The Insider spoke with Africans who had expressed support for Russia on social media and who said they wanted to help Russia at the front for ideological reasons. Joe Sergeant, from Namibia, has no military experience, but says he “loves the army with all his heart” and wants “to fight evil and the deceivers in NATO.” He believes that Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran are fighting for truth and justice.

A Nigerian man named Wilfred Father said that all countries except Ethiopia had been colonized, but that Russia had never been among the colonial powers: “Fighting for Russia would mean fighting for freedom from neocolonialism. Why should Africans today depend on Western aid in order to develop? Why is Africa a dumping ground for Western goods? Why do they take our mineral resources and give us pieces of paper in the form of dollars, which they print in enormous quantities?”

Wilfred says he knows many people who share these views. Notably, his comments about Ukraine closely mirror Russian propaganda narratives: “The war was not started by Russia, but by America through Ukraine. Russia will not lose – it has the military power to continue fighting for the right cause.” He describes opposing views as the result either of ignorance or of an unwillingness to seek out “reliable information.”

A Kenyan man named David shared with The Insider his dream of fighting for Russia: “I want to fight the terrorists from the United States, but my health does not allow it. The people who joined the Russian army have been given a great honor – to stand against true evil, depravity, and slavery. Two of my friends are still there. They call and write to their families and do not want to return until victory. Long live Putin!”

The Postpravda.Info editorial team would like to thank Arden Arkman for his cooperation.

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