No one knows how long the war in Ukraine could be. If time works in favor of Ukraine, it should avoid negotiations and drag out the war as long as possible. If time works in Russia’s favor, the Russian Federation should act in the same way,” Professor Alexander J. Motyl writes at PostPravda.info. Why?
Autor: prof. Alexander J. Motyl, Rutgers University, Newark.
Translated and edited by Piotr Kaszuwara.
- One possible way to resolve the problematic impasse of the war in Ukraine is to examine the real willingness of both sides to enter into immediate negotiations. This is based on the assumption that the more one wants to end the war, the more one is also willing to believe that one will lose it tomorrow.
- Runners know very well that a long-distance run includes short and medium series. We also know that one defeat does not invalidate a victory in the long run. A short-term victory, in turn, does not necessarily guarantee a long-term victory either. But it is certainly better than a similar defeat,” writes Professor Alexander J. Motyl of Rutgers University in the US.
- “The number of possible so-called mediating variables – seemingly random bolts of lightning that can throw accidents off the trajectory of a set course – is enormous.”
War in Ukraine: morale is important
On whose side does time stand – metaphorically speaking – Ukraine or Russia? Or to put the question more practically: which country is better prepared to survive a long war?
The answers to the questions posed above are more difficult than they might seem at first glance.
It may not seem all that important, but when it comes to winning or losing, subjective belief can be very important. Believing that you can survive a war does not at all guarantee that this is what will happen, of course, but it certainly makes quite a difference. Morale does matter. However, objective indicators of resilience for a long war – such as the number of soldiers, weapons or ammunition – undoubtedly also matter. Their quality is also important. In addition, the ability to continue the war can be affected by a number of factors relating to the internal situation at home and international issues.
This is a fairly short list, but even through it, it becomes clear that there are no easy answers to the questions at the beginning of the article.
In World War II, time might have worked in favor of Hitler’s Germany had it not been for American intervention. In the U.S. Civil War, time might not have worked in favor of the North if the British had provided the Confederacy, or the South, with the necessary weapons. Today, time may work in Russia’s favor if Putin remains in power, but the opposite could happen if he continues to make strategic mistakes, dies or is overthrown.
Supporters and opponents
The number of possible “mediating variables,” seemingly random bolts from the clear sky that can throw accidents off the trajectory of the set course, is enormous. We can imagine that these variables do not exist, but somehow they still refuse to voluntarily disappear from the event horizon.
So how can we tell which variable is the most likely one? The short answer is: we can’t do it completely. All we can do is realize the complexity of events and their possible consequences, as well as their completeness. We can also hope that the simplifications we have adopted are at least somewhat closer to the purpose of the considerations here.
Proponents of the view that since the war in Ukraine has been going on, time has worked in Russia’s favor usually point to similar circumstances. They claim that the Russian Federation’s armed forces, population and economy are larger than Ukraine’s. Therefore, they will fare better in the long run. Critics of this view, of course, share the fact that Russia is larger than Ukraine in virtually every respect. They also point to Ukraine’s much stronger morale, fewer casualties and continued support from Western countries.
To this, in turn, the first group of people responds that Ukrainian morale is ephemeral, long-term Western support is not guaranteed, and Putin has no problem sending as many soldiers to their deaths as needed and will continue to do so for as long as it takes. The other group naturally denies this. Responding that Ukrainian morale is so strong that it won’t falter even in the face of an existential threat, and that Western support is enough to extend for a few more years. This is supposed to be enough for Russia to lose. On top of that, it is argued that despite Putin’s undemocratic rule, Russians will not tolerate in the long run that nearly a million young Russian men and women have lost their lives in a few years.
At this point, I would like us to return to the point from which we started.
Negocjacje
One possible way to resolve the problematic impasse of the war in Ukraine is to examine the real willingness of both sides to engage in immediate negotiations. At the same time, based on the assumption that the more you want to end the war today, you are probably also willing to believe that you will lose it tomorrow.
If one looks at Putin’s frequent declarations that he wants to negotiate with Kiev now in this light, they may suggest that he is in fact worried about the future. But can we be sure of that? Such a claim could be true, but only if the Russian dictator were truly willing to seek some sort of compromise. In reality, his demands usually amount to a complete capitulation and near-self-destruction of Ukraine and Ukrainian independent statehood.
When we ask the same question of the other side, it might seem that Ukraine’s reluctance to talk with the Kremlin in the long term is indicative of the trust placed in its own citizens and foreign partners. One might assume so, were it not for the fact that Ukraine’s reluctance may also stem from the realization that there is simply nothing to talk about with Putin.
Answers
So is the case for a clear answer to the questions we have raised hopeless? Runners know very well that long-distance running includes short and medium series. We also know even from life experience that one defeat does not invalidate victory in the long run. A short-term victory, in turn, does not necessarily guarantee a long-term victory either, but it is certainly better than a similar defeat.
To know the final answer, we should ask ourselves another question. Because all the combinations and permutations we have analyzed perhaps distract us in some way from the essence of the problem. Namely: does the West want a victory for Ukraine, or would it prefer that the war in Ukraine end in a triumph for Russia?
The West united is undoubtedly bigger, richer and stronger than the Russian Federation. It follows indisputably that if it more or less unconditionally supports the motivated Ukrainians, Ukraine will win both in the short, medium and finally in the long term. If, on the other hand, the West does not support Ukraine, then time will side with Russia.
The government in Kiev, as well as Ukrainian citizens and soldiers on the frontlines, know this well. Moscow also knows this.
The choice facing the West, therefore, is both simple and highly stark. Does it want Ukraine to exist, as an independent state and a free nation, or does it prefer that Ukraine and its society be destroyed?
The Ukrainians chose option one. Russians the second.
So the answer lies in external factors. In that case, the West can either continue its scholastic crackdown or ultimately tip the balance of power to either side.
This means no less than that the life or death of Ukraine is in trembling hands.
About the author: Prof. Alexander Motyl
Prof. Alexander Motyl is currently a lecturer at Rutgers-Newark in the US. He is an expert on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR. In addition, he specializes in issues related to nationalism, revolutions, and the theory of empires. He is the author of 10 popular science books, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001). Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999). Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993). The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929 (1980). He is also the editor of 15 other volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and has authored dozens of articles in academic or political journals. He maintains his weekly blog, Ukraine’s Orange Blues.
Read more at PostPravda:
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